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1. Introduction 
Advocates of elementary and secondary education reform believe that the current system 
does not provide adequate checks and incentives to ensure that teachers and school 
administrators maximize student learning.  Increased accountability is seen as a necessary 
condition for improving the quality of public schools.  The two leading current reform 
movements to improve accountability involve expanding the educational choices of students and 
establishing performance standards.  In this paper, we examine a problematic design issue 
associated with the latter type of reform by analyzing behavioral responses to incentives to 
exempt students from taking exams under Texas’ system during the 1990s.  While the goal of 
establishing standards is to improve school efficiency and student outcomes, standards are 
inevitably imperfect instruments. 
Performance-based incentive systems are not new to the public sector and there is a well-
developed literature addressing the potential pitfalls.
1  First, public agencies typically pursue 
multiple goals, of which only some produce measurable outcomes.  Since rewards are 
necessarily tied to measurement, agents may divert resources toward these and away from other 
valuable outcomes.  This issue may be particularly problematic in the education setting where 
teachers multi-task and where desirable outcomes, such as social adjustment, are often not easily 
measured.   
Second, when outcomes do have empirical counterparts, the performance measures may only 
be weakly correlated with progress toward program goals.  For example, by teaching specifically 
to the content of high-stakes exams, measured achievement may improve in the absence of 
                                                            
1 Ladd (2001) provides an overview of the theoretical issues associated with designing effective performance 
standards in the school accountability context.   2 
general improvements in knowledge and ability in those subject areas.
2  Further, most states base 
school ratings on pass rates, so that schools may achieve higher ratings by targeting instruction to 
near-failing students, while not necessarily improving the performance of other students 
(Reback, 2005). 
Finally, the performance measures themselves are often flawed, so that agents can improve 
reported performance without making progress on actual performance.  We refer to behaviors 
that fall under this final potential pitfall as “gaming,” and the form of gaming that we focus on is 
the exclusion of low-achieving students from the test-taking pool.
3  When bureaucracies use 
heterogeneous inputs, as in the education sector, there is inevitably a trade-off between designing 
an accountability system that is “fair,” in terms of accounting for this heterogeneity, and 
“manipulation-proof,” in terms of ensuring that measured performance represents real 
accomplishment.  For example, some students with pre-existing academic limitations should be 
legitimately excluded from high-stakes exams, or at least given alternative treatment.  On the 
other hand, when an accountability system allows student exemptions from exams, schools are 
then able to improve measured performance by manipulating the composition of students taking 
the exams.  Officials at a strategic school might classify additional students in exempt categories, 
such as special education or limited English proficient, misreport students’ statuses, or 
“encourage” absences primarily to improve aggregate outcomes. 
Although the potential for this dysfunctional response is well recognized, there has been 
relatively limited systematic analysis of the link or its practical relevance.
4  Haney (2000) and 
                                                            
2 There is mixed evidence whether improvements on the test instruments used for accountability are matched by 
parallel gains on other exams (e.g., Hanushek and Raymond, 2005; Jacob, 2005; Klein et al., 2000). 
3 Jacob and Levitt (2003) find evidence that the accountability system in place in Chicago has led to a more 
direct form of gaming—cheating, likely by both students and teachers. 
4 The most extensive previous literature on an analogous form of caseload manipulation under performance-
based incentive systems has examined “cream-skimming” of participants by local job training agencies (e.g., 
Heckman et al., 2002; Heckman et al., 1996; Anderson et al., 1993).   3 
Deere and Strayer (2001a) provide descriptive evidence by documenting increases in special 
education classification rates particularly for minority and low-achieving students, respectively, 
following the introduction of the Texas policy.  In the presence of strong secular upward trends 
in special education placements,
5 Deere and Strayer (2001b) present more convincing evidence 
by showing a reversal in the growth in the rate at which special education students sit for 
achievement exams following a recent policy change that counts scores of special education test-
takers.  More recent studies use within-state and within-school control groups.  For example, 
Figlio and Getzler (2002) find that schools at risk of failing reclassify previously low-performing 
students as disabled at higher rates following the introduction of the testing regime in Florida,
6 
and Figlio (2005) finds that schools also alter the test-taking pool by strategically assigning long 
suspensions to low-performing students subject to disciplinary action near the test-taking 
period—and in both cases the behavior is stronger for students in tested grades.
7,8 
Our paper differs from prior studies in that it exploits the specific structure and evolution of 
the performance targets of the Texas system to formulate more precise school-level incentives.  
We begin by developing a model of the marginal benefits to administrators from exempting 
students in order to increase the probability that their schools attain higher ratings.  We then 
conduct empirical tests of two theoretical predictions that arise from the model.  First, given that 
                                                            
5 Hanushek and Raymond (2005) caution against drawing strong inferences from pre-post analyses in this 
setting, and do not find any relationship between special education classification rates and the introduction of strong 
state accountability policies in a state-level panel analysis that accounts for flexible time trends. 
6 Even when controlling for time trends, Figlio and Getzler (2002) find that the introduction of high-stakes 
testing led to about a 50 percent increase in the rate that students from low-income families were exempted from 
test-taking due to special education classifications. 
7 Jacob (2005) also finds evidence of strategic special education placements using a similar triple-differences 
strategy that compares trends in special education classification rates for low- versus high-performing students in 
low- versus high-performing schools in Chicago before and after the high-stakes testing policy. 
8 In addition to students enrolled in tested grades being exempted, low-achieving students can be excluded by 
being retained in untested grades or encouraged to drop out.  Jacob (2005) reports higher retention rates in untested 
grades following the implementation of the accountability system in Chicago.  Haney (2000) reports a similar 
finding for minorities in Texas, although Carnoy et al. (2001) show that this trend was pre-existing.  The literature 
linking testing standards to dropout rates has focused on the negative impact of grade retention and failure on 
completion (e.g., Reardon, 1996; Kreitzer et al., 1989), rather than on the interaction with school incentives.   4 
the pass rate standards apply not only to all students but separately to students within 
race/ethnicity and economic disadvantage subgroups, we analyze changes in exemptions rates 
among subgroups within the same schools.  We predict that exemption rates should increase 
most for groups whose pass rates are expected to be below the required threshold, because these 
groups are most likely to constrain the school from attaining the next-highest rating.  Our 
findings confirm this prediction; exemption rates are inflated by up to 7 and 14 percent for 
Hispanic and Black students, respectively, in years when these students are under-performing 
relative to peers in the same campus.  Although the requirements for separate subgroups are 
meant to ensure that schools target improvement efforts toward all students, this policy also 
appears to encourage targeted exemptions. 
In our second test, we use student-level test score data to explicitly compute the marginal 
benefit to a school from exempting additional students between consecutive years.  Using these 
explicit incentives, we analyze whether changes in the level of exemptions at the same school 
during consecutive years are related to changes in incentives.  Strong short-run incentives to 
exempt additional students are found to raise the likelihood that a school has a one-year increase 
in the fraction of students classified as exempt by 11 percent.  This finding for overall 
exemptions appears to be driven by more aggressive special education placements and higher 
absenteeism. 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we provide detailed 
information about the Texas accountability system.  Section 3 then presents a conceptual 
framework for measuring variation in schools’ incentives to exempt students that arises from the 
structure of the accountability system.  Sections 4 and 5 describe our empirical strategies and 
results, respectively.  Section 6 offers a brief set of implications and conclusions.   5 
 
2. Texas Accountability System 
2.1 Background 
The Texas accountability system originally applied only at the student level in the form of 
exit exams required for graduation.  School-level accountability began in 1993, with schools 
classified into four rating categories based on student pass rates.
9  The rating categories are: low-
performing, acceptable, recognized, and exemplary.
10  The same base indicators for determining 
ratings were used through 2000, after which the number of tests and grades tested were expanded 
and an entirely new set of assessments were introduced in 2003.
11  During our sample period, a 
school’s rating depends on the fraction of students who pass Spring Texas Assessment of 
Academic Skills (TAAS) achievement exams in reading, mathematics, and writing.  The reading 
and math exams are given in grades 3-8 and 10, while the writing exams are given only in grades 
4, 8, and 10.
12  For the tested grades combined, all students and four separate student subgroups 
(White, Hispanic, Black, and economically disadvantaged) must demonstrate pass rates that 
exceed year-specific standards for each category.
13  In addition, prior year dropout rates must be 
below and prior year attendance rates must be above threshold levels. 
Table 1 displays the year-specific standards for each category for the years 1993 to 1998.  
There was a planned phase-in of the pass rate standards for the acceptable and recognized 
                                                            
9 Throughout, we refer to school years by the year associated with the final term, or the fiscal year.  That is, we 
refer to school year 1993-94 as year 1994. 
10 Districts are also assigned one of four ratings, based on identical indicators defined at the district level.  
Throughout we focus on campus-level incentives, since incentives at both levels are likely to be closely aligned and 
the kinds of behaviors that could affect exemptions occur at the school level. 
11 Detailed accountability manuals are available for each year at http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/account/. 
12 There is little interaction between student and school incentives under the accountability system—student 
performance on the high-stakes tests does not directly affect retention decisions, and graduation requirements can be 
met by passing end-of-course exams or eventually passing the exit-level TAAS exam. 
13 In the first year of this system, 1993, the subgroups were not held separately accountable.  In all years, 
subgroup pass rates only count when the number of students contributing scores exceeds specified minimum levels.  
Economically disadvantaged students are those who are eligible for free- or reduced-price lunch or for other public 
assistance.   6 
categories to 50 percent by 2000 and 80 percent by 1998, respectively.  Those two categories 
also depend on improvement in pass rates from the previous year during the phase-in period.
14  
Although the thresholds have evolved, the standards for passing have remained the same. 
A school’s rating can have real consequences.  The ratings are easily understood and are 
made public.  The rating a school attains may affect how attractive it is perceived to be, which 
could affect its student population, property values, and local support for funding.
15  In addition, 
ratings can affect the regulatory burden placed on schools.  Those placed in the lowest category 
undergo an evaluation process and may be reconstituted or otherwise sanctioned, including an 
allowance for students to transfer to better-performing schools inside or outside the district.  
Schools with the highest rating become exempt from some regulations and requirements.  
Finally, in most years there have been financial awards for schools that are either high 
performing or show substantial improvement. 
The opportunity for schools to attain a higher rating by gaming this system is related to the 
way the accountability subset is defined.  In order to safeguard schools against the risks of 
serving disadvantaged populations, there are a number of categories of students that are not 
included in calculating the school’s aggregate pass rates.  During our sample period, fiscal years 
1993-98, there are four possible reasons why a student would not be tested at all: i) the student is 
in special education with a severe enough handicap to limit the usefulness of testing, ii) the 
student is limited English proficient (LEP) and the Spanish test was not offered that year, iii) the 
student was absent that day, or iv) some other reason (e.g., illness, cheating).  There are three 
possible reasons why a tested student would not have his/her performance contribute to the 
                                                            
14 The ability to substitute a minimum amount of growth in pass rates for a minimum pass rate level could, in 
theory, introduce important dynamics to schools’ incentives.  However, this more lenient alternative is only 
available for the acceptable category and, as Figure 3 shows, only a handful of campuses are ever unable to meet the 
standards for that ratings category. 
15 Figlio and Lucas (2004) find empirical evidence that the arbitrary distinctions made by Florida’s school 
report card system are capitalized into housing values, particularly in the short run.   7 
school pass rate: i) the student is tested but is in a special education program, ii) the student took 
a Spanish test, or iii) the student was mobile, i.e. not in the district as of October of the school 
year.  Classifying additional students as special needs or LEP or “helping” them to fall into any 
of these other categories could improve measured performance if these students would likely fail 
their tests. 
Policymakers and practitioners understand the role that differential exemptions can play in 
upsetting the validity of the ratings categories.  The Texas accountability system has evolved to 
address these types of concerns.  Since 1999, special education and Spanish TAAS test-takers 
have been included in the accountability subset, and more recently an assessment specifically 
designed for disabled students has been incorporated to further increase participation.  Our 
analysis is based on data from the years leading up to these reforms when gaming is likely to 
have been more prevalent.
16 
2.2 Descriptive trends 
Figure 1a presents mean school pass rates by subject and year.  For all subjects, there was a 
dramatic, steady increase in pass rates between 1994 and 1998.
17  Furthermore, this rise in 
performance occurred for all of the various accountability subgroups.  For example, Figure 1b 
reveals that the average White, Hispanic, Black, and economically disadvantaged pass rates on 
the math exam increased from 71, 52, 41, and 50 percent to 90, 81, 73, and 79 percent, 
respectively.  Though the pass rate thresholds for various accountability ratings increased over 
this period (see Table 1), these pass rate improvements were significant enough to cause an 
upward trend in school ratings.  Figure 2 displays the distribution of school ratings by year.  
Since the TAAS exams are supposed to be comparable over time, on the surface, it appears that 
                                                            
16 Although it would be revealing to track gaming before and after the tightening of restrictions on exemptions, 
the student-level data that underlie our analysis are not available to us for these more recent years. 
17 The 1993 pass rates are not directly comparable since students were tested in fewer grades in that year.   8 
there has been tremendous academic improvement. 
Figure 3 presents mixed evidence as to whether alterations in the test-taking pool can explain 
any part of this “miracle.”  After rising between 1993 and 1995, mean overall exemption rates 
have since fallen.  The fraction of students exempted due to special education placement 
increased each year, particularly for disabled students who were able to take the test.  The 
fraction LEP exempt also increased rapidly in the early years, before leveling off.  The slowing 
in the rate of growth in each of these categories could be related to the pending inclusion of 
special education and Spanish test-takers in the accountability system, which started in 1999 and 
was first announced in 1996.  The overall decrease is driven by pronounced declines in the 
fraction exempted due to mobility status. The drop in mobility exemptions in 1997 was due to a 
policy change that tightened the process for identifying a student as new to a district.
18  Thus, the 
overall decrease in exemptions does not dispel the idea that the accountability system, prior to 
becoming more inclusive, may have led to higher rates of placement in excepted categories than 
would have otherwise prevailed. 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
3.1 Basic model 
In this section, we develop a simple model of the marginal benefits and costs of exempting 
students under a pass rate threshold system.  We do not model the politics and competing 
objectives of agents within schools, and treat a school' s exemption decisions as being made by a 
single agent, or administrator.  Another important simplification is that we treat exemption 
                                                            
18 A student’s information reported on the Spring test document was no longer required to perfectly match Fall 
enrollment data for the student to be identified as having been in the district.  For instance, prior to 1997, a student 
would have been classified as mobile if his name was entered as Juan Garcia in the Fall and as John Garcia on the 
Spring exams.   9 
decisions as depending on current-year incentives, and thus ignore potential dynamic behavioral 
responses.  The framework generates testable predictions that motivate the empirical analyses 
that we conduct.  We focus our theoretical discussion exclusively on the benefits and costs that 
are directly related to the accountability system, but in our empirical analyses we do control for 
the important role of fiscal incentives to place students in special programs that arise from the 
structure of the school finance system (Cullen, 2003). 
Though there are three separate subject exams and separate hurdle requirements for student 
subgroups, start by assuming there is only one exam and that only the overall pass rate matters.  
Suppose that the administrator at school  j  takes the current level of exemptions (
0
j E ) as given 
and is deciding how many students to exempt from among the set of students who are in the 
accountability pool (
0
j j E N - ).  Define  ij P ˆ  to be the administrator' s expectation concerning the 
probability that student i will pass the exam.  Let  ij P  equal one if the student passes the exam 
and zero if the student fails, so that  ij ij ij P P e + = ˆ  with  0 ] [ = ij E e .  Assume that the disturbance 
terms associated with the administrator’s predictions are independent, or at least perceived to be 
independent by the administrator.
19  Then, the administrator’s expectation of the overall pass rate 
is based on the sum of independent binomial outcomes and is approximately normally 
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19 This assumption, ( ) { } s r E N s r Cov j j sj rj ¹ - Î " = ; , 1 , 0 ,
0 e e , affects the specific shape of the marginal benefit 
curve and facilitates the simulation of incentives in our empirical work.  It is possible that the surprises to students’ 
pass rates are not independent, such as if students in an entire classroom are not prepared to correctly answer certain 
questions.  Generalizing the framework to account for correlated disturbances would lead to the same basic 
predictions unless the individual error terms are correlated with each other in such a way that the distribution of the 


















= s .  The standard deviation of the expected pass rate is 
greater when the underlying predicted probabilities for students are more uncertain (i.e. closer to 
0.5) and when there are fewer test-takers. 
The distribution of the expected pass rate determines the potential benefits to reclassifying 
students or otherwise exempting students from the test-taking pool.  Let T  equal the closest pass 
rate threshold to  j R ˆ  (either from above or below) and define  j Z  to be the marginal benefit 
associated with attaining the higher rating.  If the administrator has risk neutral preferences, the 
marginal benefit of an additional exemption equals  j Z  times the probability that this exemption 
causes the aggregate pass rate to be above T .  The marginal benefit from increasing exemptions 
by 
0 1
j j j E E E - = D  can be written as: 
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where ￿ is the cumulative standard normal density function.  We refer to the term in square 
brackets as the raw (i.e., non-normalized) marginal benefit. 
Both the change in the expected overall pass rate and in its standard deviation will influence 
the raw marginal benefit from increased exemptions.  Assuming that administrators shrink the 
accountability pool by exempting students with the lowest pass probabilities, the expected pass 
rate will improve so that  ( ) ( )
0 1 ˆ ˆ
j j j j j j E N R E N R - ³ - .  Selective new exemptions will also 
typically decrease the standard deviation, which on its own has an ambiguous effect on the 
probability that the overall pass rate exceeds the required threshold, depending on whether the 
mean expected pass rate is above or below the threshold.  Regardless, changes in the expected   11 
pass rate will generally dominate, so that additional exemptions are beneficial. 
In order to provide intuition for when incentives for additional exemptions are likely to be 
greatest, it is helpful to graph the marginal benefit curve under different scenarios.  Consider an 
example where an administrator expects 68 percent of the accountability pool to pass this year’s 
exam.  Suppose the nearest pass rate threshold is 70 percent, so that the school is deemed 
“recognized” if the pass rate is at least that high.  If the administrator exempts an additional 
(approximately) 2 percent of students in tested grades, and these students all had near zero 
probabilities of passing, then the likelihood of reaching the next highest rating increases to 50 
percent.  Figure 4a shows the shift in the distribution of the expected pass rate, with the 
associated increase in the probability of meeting the criterion represented by shaded area A.  
Note that, abstracting from evolutions in the standard deviation that accompany additional 
exemptions, the experiment could equivalently be carried out by hypothetically sequentially 
shifting the threshold down.  From this perspective, as the administrator increases exemptions 
starting from the status quo, the raw marginal benefit curve would track the original pass rate 
distribution curve in reverse starting from where it crosses the relevant pass rate threshold, and 
the two shaded areas in the figure are identical. 
Figure 4b illustrates marginal benefit curves for a school under two pass rate regimes.  In 
Figure 4b, the x-axis shows the percentage point increase in the exemption rate (as a fraction of 
total enrollment), starting at the status quo.  These illustrations are derived from the notion 
established above that the raw marginal benefit curve is closely related to the initial probability 
density function for the expected overall pass rate, adjusted for changes in the standard deviation 
as additional students are exempted and scaled by  j Z .  As shown, the marginal benefit to 
exempting additional students when the initial pass rate is above the threshold (e.g., a threshold   12 
of 0.66) will generally be steadily decreasing.  In contrast, the marginal benefit schedule when 
the initial pass rate is below the threshold, as in the case shown in Figure 4a, will at first increase 
and then decrease. 
In order to determine how many students a given school would optimally choose to exempt, 
the marginal benefits have to be traded off against marginal costs.  We presume that marginal 
costs are an increasing function of the level of exemptions, although the testable predictions that 
we develop in the next section do not depend on this.  Exempting additional students likely 
involves short-run costs associated with reclassification, as well as long-run costs associated with 
providing a different type of service to the student.  Schools are discouraged from classifying 
students as special education or LEP on test-day without actually assigning special services by 
the threat of audit if the number exempted exceeds service caseloads.  The state also threatens to 
audit schools with excessively high absenteeism relative to annual attendance rates or high rates 
of “other” exemptions. 
Figure 4b also depicts a representative marginal cost curve.  In order to interpret the marginal 
cost curve appropriately, realize that the x-axis equivalently indexes the overall number of 
exemptions, with the origin set to the current exemption rate.  In the example that is depicted, the 
marginal benefit to additional exemptions exceeds the marginal cost regardless of whether the 
threshold is high or low.  The administrator will in one case want to improve the chances of 
attaining the higher rating, and in the other reduce the risk of receiving the lower rating.  If the 
thresholds are equidistant from the mean expected pass rate across the two regimes, the 
administrator will generally behave more aggressively in the high-threshold regime.  Obviously, 
administrators will also often have incentives to decrease exemptions, which in this framework 
would occur when policy or other changes cause marginal costs to exceed marginal benefits at   13 
the existing level of exemptions. 
3.2 Testable predictions 
Our first empirical test uses within-school variation in whether subgroup pass rates are 
expected to be above or below the closest relevant threshold.  Consider the case where there are 
two mutually exclusive subgroups in a campus.  If one group’s expected rate is above the 
threshold (group A) while the other’s is below (group B), exempting students in the former group 
is associated with muted benefits.  The reduction in the risk that group A falls below the 
threshold translates into only a fractional reduction in the risk that the school is rated in the lower 
category.  
For example, suppose a school’s rating is only influenced by the pass rates of these two 
mutually exclusive subgroups.  Using the notation developed above, the marginal benefit of 
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The last term represents the probability that the school satisfies the pass rate requirement for the 
other group.  The marginal benefit to increasing exemptions for group B by a given amount will 

























 and f  is the 
standard normal probability density function.  If the variances are the same, this condition always 
holds whenever Aj Bj k k < , since log-concavity of the normal density and distribution implies the 
hazard function ( ( ) F - 1 f ) is everywhere increasing.  We empirically test the prediction that,   14 
controlling for factors related to the variance of the test score distribution and to the cost of 
exempting students on the margin, there should be larger increases in exemption rates for student 
groups with expected pass rates below the relevant threshold ( 0 < Bj k ) than for student groups 
with expected pass rates exceeding this threshold ( 0 > Aj k ). 
Our second empirical test uses student-level data to explicitly calculate shifts in schools’ 
marginal benefit curves between years.  Figures 4c and 4d illustrate the relationship between 
changes in marginal benefits and changes in exemption levels.  Figure 4c shows three different 
potential marginal benefit curves for a school where the mean expected pass rate is in all cases 
above the relevant threshold, and each curve is associated with a threshold of differing 
stringency.  These marginal benefit curves do not cross, so that one can readily determine 
whether incentives have increased or decreased.  In Figure 4d, where similar curves are shown 
for a campus with the mean expected pass rate below the threshold values, which regime induces 
the greatest increase in exemptions depends on the school’s cost function.  If there are steep 
marginal costs associated with higher exemption levels, then schools may increase exemptions 
by less when their expected pass rate is relatively far from the required threshold. 
We structure the empirical analysis in order to test predictions that are robust to these 
underlying ambiguities.  First, we characterize the marginal benefit curve local to the observed 
exemption level in the prior year, and then determine whether the curve shifts up or down over a 
range of incremental exemptions.  Assuming that marginal cost curves are fairly stable across 
consecutive years, schools with local upward shifts in the marginal benefit curve should be more 
likely to increase exemption rates than schools with local downward shifts.  Further, the greater 
is the upward shift, the greater is the likelihood of an increase in exemptions from the prior year.  
Although we also estimate the relationship between changes in the level of exemptions and these   15 
changes in incentives, the predictions for the continuous outcome measure are not similarly 
independent of the shape of the marginal cost curve. 
 
4. Data and empirical strategies 
4.1 Data 
We combine several administrative data sets, each collected and provided by the Texas 
Education Agency.  These data sets include school- and student-level panel data.  The school-
level data for the years 1993 through 1998 come from the Academic Excellence Indicator 
System (AEIS), and are publicly available for download from the Texas Education Agency 
(http://www.tea.state.tx.us/perfreport/aeis/).  The AEIS data are used to determine school ratings 
and include overall and student subgroup pass rates, attendance and dropout rates, and exemption 
rates broken down by type of exemption and student subgroup.  These data also include a wide 
variety of campus demographic and financial variables.  We purchased the restricted-use student-
level data from the Public Education Information Management System (PEIMS) for the same 
years.  These data include test scores, exemption status, and basic demographics for all students 
in tested grades.  Individual students can be tracked across years and campuses through student- 
and campus-specific identifiers. 
The total number of schools in Texas during our sample period ranges from 6,184 in 1993 to 
7,053 in 1998.  We analyze the 88 percent of schools (representing 97 percent of students) that 
are rated based on the standard accountability system and their own test scores.  Schools that are 
excluded from our analysis fall into three categories: i) campuses that are not rated because they 
do not serve students in grades 1-12 (e.g., pre-kindergarten centers and special education 
schools), ii) alternative education campuses that are evaluated under a different system, and iii)   16 
schools that are assigned the test score performance of the school with which they have a feeder 
relationship since they do not serve students in tested grades (e.g., K-2
nd grade and 9
th grade 
centers).  Although information from the early years is used in the calculation of incentives for 
other years, our regression samples exclude 1993, since not all of the relevant grades were tested 
in that year, and exclude 1994, to allow us to model changes in exemption rates from the prior 
year.
20 
4.2 Comparison of subgroups within schools 
Our first empirical analysis focuses on schools in which there is heterogeneity in the 
achievement of student subgroups relative to the relevant pass rate standard.  As previously 
shown, we would generally expect a strategic school administrator to increase exemptions by 
more (or decrease exemptions by less) for groups that are predicted to perform below the 
threshold.  We test this proposition by investigating whether these groups exhibit greater one-
year changes in exemption rates than other groups within the same school and year. 
Since actual student performance is endogenous with respect to exemptions, we determine 
overall and subgroup-specific expected pass rates by using the prior year performance of 
students and adjusting for upward trends in achievement.  In particular, we find the statewide 
percentile associated with the lowest-scoring student in a given grade who passed during year t, 
and then calculate the fraction of students in that grade in each school (and each subgroup at the 
school) that scored at that percentile or better in year t–1.  School administrators and teachers 
likely expect an achievement distribution similar to that of the previous year’s cohort, adjusted 
for upward trends in achievement. 
Given these expected pass rates, we then determine the target rating for each school by 
identifying the lowest rating for which at least one relevant pass rate is expected to be below the 
                                                            
20 In 1993, only students in grades 4, 8, and 10 were tested.   17 
standard required threshold.  We classify a group as “under” if the subgroup contributes to the 
school’s rating and its expected pass rate (on either reading or math) is below this threshold and 
fails to satisfy any alternative less-binding criteria (such as required improvement).
21  Subgroups 
that are not classified as “under” either have expected pass rates that satisfy the requirements for 
the relevant ratings category or are not held separately accountable because there are too few 
students represented in the group.
22 
A campus may have up to three mutually exclusive race/ethnicity subgroups: White, 
Hispanic, and Black.  For those campus-years with multiple subgroups and across-subgroup 
variation in “under” status, we estimate the following baseline regression model: 
jgt gjt gjt
djt gjt gjt gjt g jt gjt Under d d Under e
e
q q q d a
+ + +
´ ´ + ´ + ´ + + = D
-
- -
￿ X ￿ T 1
1 3 1 2 1
 ,         (3) 
where g,  j, and t denote the subgroup, school, and year, respectively.  The dependent variable is 
the change in the exemption rate from the prior year.   gjt Under  is a dummy variable equal to one 
if the group’s pass rate is expected to hold the campus back from attaining the next highest 
rating.  To incorporate any differential incentives to exempt economically disadvantaged 
students and differing degrees of overlap between this subgroup and the race/ethnicity 
subgroups, we include the fraction of the subgroup that is economically disadvantaged in the 
prior year ( 1 - gjt d ), and an interaction between this fraction and an indicator for whether the 
economically disadvantaged subgroup is predicted to be “under” ( djt Under ).  Importantly, the 
specification includes campus-year fixed effects ( jt a ), so that the model identifies the effect of 
                                                            
21 We ignore writing since only rarely do subgroups fail to satisfy that requirement if the reading requirement is 
met.  Math is almost always the binding subject, and in only 10 percent of cases does the subgroup meet the math 
requirement but fall short of the reading requirement. 
22 Pass rates for student subgroups with either fewer than 30 students tested or fewer than 200 students tested 
and less than 10 percent of all tested students do not factor into campus ratings under the Texas system.  A subgroup 
is predicted to fail minimum size requirements based on its status in t–1.   18 
“under” status relative to other student groups in the same campus and year. 
The remaining variables included in the control set attempt to eliminate the potential for 
confounding factors that may be correlated with a group’s expected status.  First, groups that are 
“under” will tend to have relatively low academic ability, so that there may be secular 
differences in exemption patterns for this reason.  Also, campuses may face differential marginal 
costs of exemptions through special program placements for students from different 
race/ethnicity subgroups for unrelated reasons.  To address these concerns, we control for the 
fraction of students in the subgroup in the prior year with math and reading test scores in various 
failing ranges ( 1 - gjt T ) and subgroup fixed effects ( g d ).
23  The distribution of prior scores also 
helps to control for differences in the standard deviations of the expected pass rates across 
groups, as do the control variables related to the relative and absolute size of group g included in 
the vector gjt X .
24 
Although our baseline model controls for any shared school-wide changes in exemptions 
between years, since we include controls for campus-year, we also report specifications that 
allow there to be random growth that differs by subgroups within schools.  In these cases, the 
effect of being below the threshold is identified by subgroups that are “under” in some years and 
not in others. 
4.3 Relationship between changes in campus-level exemption rates and incentives 
Our second empirical test explores whether schools are more likely to increase exemptions 
when the potential impact on the likelihood of attaining the relevant rating from additional 
                                                            
23 For both math and reading, we include the fraction of students in the group scoring in the following failing 
ranges (i.e., scores below 70) during the prior year: below 50, 50-59, 60-64, and 65-69. 
24 The vector 
gjt X  includes prior year level and changes in the subgroup’s share of enrollment in tested grades 
and the number of students in tested grades (measured by a five-part spline with cut-points defined by quantiles of 
the size distribution).  Also included is the change in the share of students economically disadvantaged.   19 
exemptions increases between back-to-back years.  Our approach is to first estimate the raw 
marginal benefit curve associated with additional exemptions in t–1.  Then, artificially holding 
the set of students in the accountability subset fixed, we simulate the raw marginal benefit curve 
in t by adjusting predicted pass probabilities for statewide upward trends and allowing the 
accountability rules to update.  This allows us to isolate exogenous variation in changes in 
incentives for the same school that arises from changes in the required pass rate thresholds and 
the general upward trend in student performance over time. 
We begin by describing how we estimate the raw marginal benefit curve associated with 
additional exemptions in t–1.  First, each student in the accountability subset in t–1 is assigned a 
pass probability for each exam equal to the statewide fraction of students with the same test score 
in t–2 who actually pass the exam in t–1.
25  Second, we calculate the expected pass rate for all 
students and each student subgroup on each exam ( gj R ˆ ), as well as the standard deviation in 
these rates ( gj s ), in t–1 by aggregating the student-level pass probabilities.   
If these performance measures were independent, we could readily calculate the probability 
that a school meets the relevant targets for each rating by calculating the probability each student 
group exceeds the requirement for each subject and then multiplying these probabilities across 
subjects and groups.  However, shocks to a student’s performance may be correlated across 
                                                            
25 All of the calculations are done separately by grade.  For grades 4 though 8, we group students who earned 
identical scores in the prior year on the math, reading, or writing exam, depending which is the outcome of interest.  
If students are missing prior year scores for certain subjects, we use prior year scores on the other subjects if 
available.  If all prior year scores are missing, we assign the average estimated probability of passing among 
students who earned the same score in the current year.  For grade 10, since students are not tested in grade 9, we 
group students based on scores in grade 8 (two years earlier), and then apply the same procedures as for the other 
grades.  A few 10
th grade students automatically count as passing the exam, because they passed the exam 
previously, and we set these students’ pass probabilities equal to one.  For grade 3, since this is the first grade of 
testing and prior scores are never available, we assign the same pass probability to all students within a school, 
based on the scores of the previous year’s cohort within that school.  We use the same method for third graders as 
described in the previous section: finding the statewide percentile associated with the lowest-scoring third grade 
student who passed in the current year and calculating the fraction of students in each school’s third grade that 
scored at that percentile or better in the prior year.   20 
exams, and all students contribute to the overall pass rate as well as possibly to that of a 
race/ethnicity and/or the economically disadvantaged subgroup.  For tractability, we assume that 
math and reading performance are independent, but assume that writing requirements will 
always be satisfied if reading requirements are satisfied.
26  In aggregating across groups, we use 
the lowest of the following three probability measures for math and reading: (1) the product of 
the probabilities that each accountable racial subgroup meets the required threshold, (2) the 
product of the probabilities that the economically disadvantaged subgroup and the White 
subgroup, if accountable, meet the required threshold,
27 and (3) the probability that the overall 
campus pass rate meets the required threshold.
28  We are implicitly assuming that whenever the 
most binding subset of indicators satisfies the requirements, so will the remaining indicators.  For 
example, if it is less likely that a school meets the required pass rate for all race/ethnicity 
subgroups than for the overall student population, then we presume that the overall pass rate 
exceeds this threshold in the event that the pass rates for all race/ethnicity subgroups do. 
Given this method of using individual student pass probabilities to determine the likelihood 
that a school obtains a certain rating, we can easily calculate the change in this likelihood if one 
additional student becomes exempted.  We determine the most advantageous exemption for each 
campus as that which generates the greatest increase in the probability of attaining any of the 
three ratings, and identify the ratings category most relevant to the campus as the one associated 
with the maximum increase.  We then treat that student as exempted, determine which subgroups 
continue to meet the minimum size requirements, adjust the expected pass rates and standard 
deviations, re-calculate the probabilities that the school meets the relevant performance 
                                                            
26 This assumption holds very well in the data; in 95 percent of the cases in which the reading pass rate 
threshold is met, the writing pass rate threshold is also met. 
27 While nearly two-thirds of minority students are economically disadvantaged, less than one-third of White 
students are.  Given that there is far less overlap, it is reasonable to treat the White subgroup as distinct. 
28 We also account for dropout and attendance rates—setting the probability of attaining any given rating to zero 
if these criteria (which are based on prior year outcomes) are not satisfied.   21 
standards, and use these probabilities to determine the new likelihood that the school will obtain 
the rating.  We repeat this process until we have traced out the raw marginal benefit to a campus 
for exempting various numbers of additional students.   
We follow the same process in order to simulate the raw marginal benefit curve in the 
following year, t.  We start with the accountability subset in t–1 as before, and the only 
differences are that we adjust the student-level predicted pass probabilities for statewide trends 
and update the policy parameters.
29 
Figure 5 illustrates our resulting measures of the change in incentives for an example case.  
We determine whether the raw marginal benefits to exempting an additional one, two, and three 
percent of students in tested grades have all either increased or decreased.
30  We can also 
measure the amount by which the marginal benefit curve has shifted, shown by areas a, b, and c 
in the figure.  Assuming that the marginal costs of exempting additional students and the 
marginal benefits to attaining the next highest rating (Zj) remain relatively constant across 
consecutive years, schools should be more likely to increase exemptions from the prior year 
when the raw marginal benefit has shifted up in the directly relevant range, as compared to when 
it has shifted down. 
The baseline regression model that we estimate is: 




jt jt u T y + ´ + + + + ´ + ´ = - d h l b b ￿ X 1 2 1 1 1 ,      (4) 
where j and t denote the school and year, respectively.  The dependent variable is either a 
dummy variable indicating whether exemptions increased or the change in the exemption rate 
                                                            
29 We assign each student a predicted pass probability for each exam in t by upgrading the pass probability used 
in the prior calculations to that at the same percentile of the statewide distribution of predicted pass probabilities 
(calculated in exactly the same way as for students in t–1) for students in year t.   
30 We chose to consider exemptions up to an additional three percent since that is the increase at the 75
th 
percentile of the distribution of one-year changes in exemptions.   22 
from the prior year.
31  Our key incentive measure is a dummy variable indicating that the raw 
marginal benefit curve is higher at all three levels of additional exemptions in the second year of 
the comparison (
inc
jt 1 ).  If schools behave strategically, then we expect 0 1 > b .  The specification 
also includes an indicator for cases where the curve shifts up at some points and down at others 
(
ambig
jt 1 ), so that the reference group includes cases where the curve shifts everywhere down.  To 
account for the fact that the relevant ratings category varies across campuses and perhaps from 
the prior year, we include dummies indicating the ratings category predicted to be relevant in the 
current ( ct l ) and prior year ( 1 - ct h ).  Because our incentive measure is based on simulated 
changes in the raw marginal benefit curve, we also present results where the sample is restricted 
to campus-years when the relevant ratings category (and hence j Z ) is predicted to be the same as 
the prior year. 
The vector  jt X  includes a variety of campus-level control variables related to the size and 
demographic composition of students that may affect the marginal costs of exempting students.
32  
The predicted overall math and reading pass rates based on the accountability subset in t–1 are 
also included to allow for heterogeneity in trends in exemptions related strictly to average 
performance, so that the variation across campuses in the increase in incentives comes from 
more subtle variation in the distribution of test scores and heterogeneity across student 
subgroups.  Finally, we include year-specific tax base quintile effects to capture secular time 
effects and schools’ fiscal incentives to place students in exempt categories, particularly special 
                                                            
31 We estimate both models using ordinary least squares to facilitate the inclusion of campus fixed effects in 
some specifications.  We have estimated the models with the binary variable as the dependent variable that do not 
include campus fixed effects using a Probit specification as well.  The estimated marginal effects evaluated at the 
mean are nearly identical to the point estimates that we report for our key variables from the linear model. 
32 We control for the prior year level and change in the following variables: the fraction of students who are in 
one of the tested grades, the grade and race/ethnicity distribution of students across tested grades, and a five-part 
spline measuring the number of students in tested grades at the school.   23 
and bilingual education, that arise from the structure of the school finance system (Cullen, 2003). 
In addition to estimating equation (4), we also present results from models that add campus 
fixed effects to allow for campus-specific random growth in exemptions.  This model identifies 
strategic responses from differential behavior on the part of campuses across years when 
incentives have increased and years when they have decreased.  Finally, we also estimate a 
variation that adds an interaction between the indicator for an increase in incentives and the 
magnitude of the increase, to test whether campuses are more likely to react when there is a 
greater upward shift in the marginal benefit curve. 
 
5. Results 
In this section, we present the empirical results for our two tests.  The first test explores 
whether campuses broadly target exemptions to subgroups for which exemptions are most 
advantageous from the perspective of attaining or maintaining a higher rating.  The second test 
considers strategic behavior at a finer level—whether campuses respond to short-run increases in 
incentives to exempt more students that are determined by expected positioning relative to the 
phased-in pass rate targets. 
5.1 Comparison of subgroups within schools 
The sample for this analysis includes campus-years that have variation in the “under” status 
of race/ethnicity subgroups over the period 1995 through 1998.  We lose 36 percent of 
observations for which either only one subgroup is held separately accountable or all are 
predicted to exceed the less restrictive requirements for the most relevant rating.  We exclude an 
additional 5 percent of observations for campuses that have variation across years in the set of 
race/ethnicity subgroups that are represented (i.e., at least 5 students in the subgroup in tested   24 
grades).  This leaves us with 11,026 campus-year observations, representing 59 percent of 
regular education campuses in those years.
33 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for this sample.  White and Hispanic subgroups are 
represented at most campuses in our analysis sample, while Black subgroups are represented at 
only 72 percent of campuses.  The disparities in achievement shown in Figure 1b across 
subgroups underlie the differences in the rates at which the various subgroups are predicted to be 
holding the campus back from the next highest rating.  When present, White, Hispanic, and 
Black students are predicted to be “under” 24, 64, and 54 percent of the time, respectively.  
Although Hispanics tend to outperform Blacks, Black subgroups are more likely to be too small 
to be separately accountable.  When White students are “under” they are most commonly in a 
school with Hispanic and Black peers that are not necessarily out-performing them, but that are 
not separately accountable.  For the majority of cases where the Hispanic and Black subgroups 
are classified as “under,” the White subgroup is predicted to exceed the ratings requirements. 
Table 3 presents the regression results for the independent variables of most interest from 
estimating variants of equation (3).  In all cases, the dependent variable is the change in the 
subgroup’s exemption rate from the prior year and the control set includes campus-year fixed 
effects.  The findings confirm our hypothesis that campuses target exemptions toward student 
subgroups when they are likely to prevent the campus from earning a higher rating.  The 
estimates presented in the first column suggest that membership in a subgroup that is “under” 
(i.e., a subgroup whose pass rate is expected to be below the required threshold) is associated 
with a statistically significant 0.6 percentage point increase in exemptions.  However, there does 
not appear to be a differential effect on exemptions for subgroups that have a high fraction low-
                                                            
33 Although we analyze a restricted sample, the mean rates at which students in the three race/ethnicity 
subgroups are exempted are nearly the same as in the full sample.   25 
income when the low-income subgroup is predicted to be “under.”  There is also evidence of a 
secular trend toward relative decreases in exemptions for Hispanic and Black subgroups.
34  This 
underlying tendency may have been partly due to aforementioned longitudinal changes in the 
feasibility of certain types of exemptions; mobility exemptions became more difficult in the 
middle of the sample period and schools knew that limited English proficiency exemptions 
would disappear with the introduction of Spanish exams after our sample period. 
Column 2 is a more demanding specification that adds fixed effects for subgroups by 
campus.  These estimates are identified from the relative changes in exemptions, as compared to 
peers in the same campus, across years when the subgroup is predicted to be holding the campus 
back and years when there is not an incentive to target exemptions to that subgroup.
35  Here the 
effect of being “under” rises to a 1.7 percentage point (or more than a five percent) increase in 
exemptions that is also highly statistically significant. 
Columns 3 and 4 consider whether the effect varies by race/ethnicity subgroup, with the 
second set of estimates from the specification that includes campus-subgroup fixed effects.  
There is strong evidence of strategic targeting for Hispanic and Black students, but no similar 
shifting to White subgroups when the subgroup is “under.”  The net increases for Hispanic and 
Black subgroups are 1.1 and 1.2 percentage points, respectively, in the model without campus-
subgroup fixed effects, and 2.3 and 3.9 percentage points when those are included.  These 
statistically significant one-year changes are equivalent to .15 and .36 standard deviations of 
their respective mean exemption levels.  Incentives related to subgroup performance appear to 
negate schools’ underlying tendency to shift exemptions away from Hispanic and Black students 
                                                            
34 Point estimates reveal similarly-sized (although statistically insignificant) negative trends in exemption rates 
for Hispanic and Black students in the sample of 355 campus-years for which there are no differential incentives to 
exempt low-performing students from any particular subgroup (i.e., no student subgroup is large enough to be 
separately accountable). 
35 Approximately one-third of campuses have variation across years in the status of at least one group.   26 
and towards White students over our sample period.   
The final two columns of Table 3 test for an exacerbating effect on subgroups that are 
predicted to be low-performing, and that also have a high share low-income in campus-years 
when the low-income group is predicted to be “under.”  In these cases, exempting members of a 
particular race/ethnicity group may be particularly beneficial.  This prediction appears to hold, 
particularly when the model includes campus-subgroup fixed effects.  Consider a racial subgroup 
that has 50 percent of its students in the low-income category, which is approximately the mean 
rate.  The estimates in column 6 imply that, compared to cases in which neither this 
race/ethnicity subgroup nor the low income subgroup is “under,” when both are “under” 
exemptions increase by 2.1 percentage points, an effect that is 1.25 times as large as our baseline 
estimate in column 2. 
In results that are not shown, we find that the estimates are quite similar if we split the 
sample into two periods: pre-1997 and post-1997.  We also find that the results are robust to the 
inclusion of race-year fixed effects.  We also do not find any evidence of differential 
responsiveness depending on whether subgroups are holding the campus back from escaping a 
low rating or from attaining a high rating. 
5.2 Relationship between changes in campus-level exemption rates and incentives 
The sample for this analysis is based on campuses for the years 1996 through 1998.  We lose 
observations from 1995 since this is the first year for which there are two years of prior data 
available for calculating incentives (we require information on 8
th graders in t–2), and this year 
serves as the basis for determining whether incentives have increased or not in 1996.  After 
excluding five percent of observations where the relevant ratings category does not remain 
constant as we trace out the raw marginal benefit curve for increasing exemptions by up to three   27 
percentage points, 16,567 campus-year observations remain. 
Table 4 presents summary statistics for this sample.  On average, 25.3 percent of students are 
excluded from the accountability subset, and the majority of these students are exempt due to 
special education placement.  Slightly less than half of campuses increase exemptions between 
years.  The incentives to exempt students on the margin are also predicted to have increased from 
the prior year nearly half of the time.  Conditional on increasing, the mean magnitude of the 
increase is 22.1 percentage points.  To interpret this value, recall that we calculate the raw 
marginal benefit as the change in the probability that the campus meets the requirements for the 
most relevant rating associated with exempting an additional three percent of students, and that 
this variable captures the change in this marginal benefit from the prior year. 
Table 5 presents ordinary least squares regression results from specifications based on 
equation (4).  Each cell in the table reports the estimated coefficient on an indicator for whether 
incentives increased from the prior year from a separate regression.  The top panel shows results 
for the full sample, while the bottom panel restricts the sample to campus-years when the 
relevant ratings category is predicted to remain the same as in the prior year.  For the latter 
sample, there is less uncertainty about whether marginal benefits including the scaling factor  j Z  
have increased conditional on determining that the raw marginal benefit curve has shifted up.   
The results in column 1 are based on specifications where the dependent variable is a binary 
indicator signaling whether the exemption rate increased from the prior year.  In the full sample, 
campuses with increased incentives are 1.6 percentage points more likely to increase overall 
exemptions.  The effect is larger in the sample with no change in the relevant ratings category.  
Here, the increase is 3.4 percentage points, or approximately seven percent of the sample mean.  
These effects for overall exemptions appear to be driven by special education exemptions and   28 
exemptions due to absences and other miscellaneous reasons.  The specifications in column 2 
control for campus fixed effects, allowing for differential growth rates across campuses.  
Although the point estimates are somewhat attenuated, the loss of statistical significance is 
primarily explained by loss of precision.  Only slightly more than half of the campuses in our 
sample experience both years with increased incentives and years with decreased incentives. 
The dependent variable in column 3 is the change in the exemption rate.  While the point 
estimate is not statistically significant in the full sample, increased incentives lead to a 
statistically significantly 0.41 percentage point increases in overall exemptions in the restricted 
sample.  Again, the effect can be attributed to special education and absences, which increase by 
0.23 and 0.08 percentage points respectively.  Only the statistical significance of the overall 
exemption rate survives the inclusion of campus fixed effects in column 4.  These effects are 
relatively small, ranging from 0.04 to 0.08 standard deviations of the distribution of annual 
changes.  Recall that the theoretical prediction for the size of the change in the level of 
exemptions is not as clear as for the likelihood that exemptions increase. 
Table 6 presents results from specifications that add an interaction term between the indicator 
for an increase in incentives and the magnitude of the increase to the control set.  A larger 
increase is associated with a greater probability of increasing exemptions between years.  To 
interpret the magnitude of these estimates, compare two administrators: one that has no increase 
in incentives from the prior year, and one for whom the likelihood of meeting the ratings criteria 
through additional exemptions has increased by 50 percentage points (one standard deviation 
above the mean increase).  The estimates for the full sample in columns (1a) and (1b) imply that 
the overall exemption rate would be 2.8 percentage points more likely to increase at the school 
where the administrator faces enhanced incentives.  For the restricted sample, the predicted   29 
increase in the likelihood is 5.1 percentage points (or 11 percent).  The estimated responsiveness 
is slightly larger for the second specification that controls for campus fixed effects. 
Table 6 also reveals that there are no statistically or economically significant relationships 
between the magnitude of the change in incentives and the change in the level of exemptions.  
Although exemptions are more likely to increase at all when there is a large upward shift in the 
marginal benefit curve associated with incremental exemptions, relatively strong incentives 
measured locally do not systematically lead to relatively large increases in exemptions. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Given the difficulties associated with designing an accountability system that is both fair and 
manipulation proof, we investigate the extent to which administrators appear to exploit loopholes 
that allow for exemptions for students that are at an academic disadvantage.  We first develop a 
simple model of the incentives to exempt marginal students in order to secure more favorable 
ratings under the system that was in place in Texas during the mid 1990s.  The model generates 
two testable predictions that motivate our empirical analyses.  In our first empirical test, we find 
that, regardless of whether incentives to exempt additional students increase or decrease from the 
prior year, campuses actively preserve or increase those exemptions that are most advantageous.  
This leads to a targeting of exemptions toward low-performing Hispanic and Black students.  In 
the second test, we find that campuses respond to short-run increases in incentives to expand 
exemption rates between consecutive years by classifying more students as special needs and 
encouraging absences. 
The gaming that we observe involves potential real costs—costs to the schools that expend 
resources to engage in this activity, and costs due to decisions that are made based on distorted   30 
measures of performance.  To the extent the accountability ratings reflect arbitrary differences in 
classification practices, these misleading ratings can lead to inefficiencies such as misguided 
educational policy decisions, misguided enrollment decisions, and unwarranted changes in 
property values.  There may be unintended, real (positive or negative) effects on student 
outcomes if the induced changes in classifications change the type of instruction a student 
receives or the student’s label.  The social welfare implications of classifying additional students 
in special programs depend on the level of pre-existing distortions.  Cullen (2003) finds that 
financial incentives under the school finance system already likely lead to excessive 
classifications, so that the accountability system exacerbates rather than corrects existing 
distortions. 
Texas’ accountability program served as the blueprint for the No Child Left Behind Act of 
2001 (NCLB), a federal law requiring all states to adopt standardized testing for students in 
grades three to eight and to use student proficiency rates in order to rate schools.  A key 
difference between current state systems and the early Texas system is the presence of a 
minimum participation requirement of 95 percent of students in the tested grades.  Critics of this 
participation requirement are concerned that schools serving high fractions of high needs 
students are at a disadvantage, but sacrifices in vertical equity may be warranted if the more 
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Special ed not tested
 
Notes: During this period special education students were exempt regardless of whether they took any of the exams, 
and LEP students were exempt unless they took the English exams.  The shift in the composition of LEP exemptions 
toward tested students is due to the introduction of Spanish exams for grades 3-4 in 1995 and grades 3-6 in 1996.  
Mobile students are students who were not enrolled in the district as of October of the school year.  
 
























Notes: The standard deviation in the illustration is set equal to 0.027—which is the average in our sample for 
campuses of typical size (enrollment in the range of 200 to 400 students) with simulated mean expected pass rates in 
the range of .65 to .75 in 1995. 
 
Figure 4b. Illustrative comparison of incentives across regimes
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Figure 4c. Illustrative comparison of incentives across regimes
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Figure 4d. Illustrative comparison of incentives across regimes
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Figure 5. Illustrative increase in the "raw" marginal benefit curve
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Table 1. Key provisions of the Texas accountability system 
  Minimum TAAS Pass Rate  Maximum Dropout Rate  Minimum Attendance Rate 
  E  R  A  E  R  A  E  R  A 
1993  90.0%
  65.0%  20.0%  1.0%  3.5%  N/A  97.0%  95.0%  N/A 
1994  90.0%  65.0%  25.0%  1.0%  3.5%  N/A  94.0%  94.0%  N/A 
1995  90.0%  70.0%  25.0%  1.0%  3.5%  6.0%  94.0%  94.0%  N/A 
1996  90.0%  70.0%  30.0%  1.0%  3.5%  6.0%  94.0%  94.0%  N/A 
1997  90.0%  75.0%  35.0%  1.0%  3.5%  6.0%  94.0%  94.0%  N/A 
1998  90.0%  80.0%  40.0%  1.0%  3.5%  6.0%  94.0%  94.0%  N/A 
Notes:  Schools are assigned one of four ratings:  exemplary (E), recognized (R), acceptable (A), or low-performing.  
Schools are evaluated on three performance measures: current pass rates on the Spring TAAS exams for tested 
grades, dropout rates for grades 7-12 from the prior year, and the attendance rate for students in grades 1-12 from 
the prior year.  All students and each separate student group (White, Hispanic, Black, and economically 
disadvantaged) must satisfy the test score and dropout requirements.  Except for in 1993 when the requirement 
applied only to all tests taken combined, the pass rates apply separately to each subject area exam (mathematics, 
reading, and writing). 
The dark shading indicates that there are additional requirements (such as sustained performance or required 
improvement) that mean a school could achieve the indicated standard and still not obtain the indicated rating.   
The light shading indicates that there are alternative provisions (such as required improvement and single 
group waivers) that mean the minimum standards are not always binding.  
Table 2. Summary statistics for analysis of race/ethnicity subgroups 
Student subgroup  Variable  White  Hispanic  Black 






















































       
Fraction of campus-years:       
Subgroup is represented  0.957  0.948  0.724 
Subgroup’s  pass rate is below the standard  0.233  0.605  0.392 
When subgroup’s pass rate is below the standard:       
White subgroup’s pass rate is above the standard  0  0.669  0.741 
White subgroup’s pass rate is below the standard  1  0.093  0.055 
White subgroup is not separately accountable  0  0.219  0.121 
Hispanic subgroup’s pass rate is above the standard  0.030  0  0.178 
Hispanic subgroup’s pass rate is below the standard  0.242  1  0.387 
Hispanic subgroup is not separately accountable  0.617  0  0.366 
Black subgroup’s pass rate is above the standard  0.003  0.015  0 
Black subgroup’s pass rate is below the standard  0.093  0.250  1 
Black subgroup is not separately accountable  0.565  0.402  0 
       
Number of observations  10,552  10,449  7,983 
Notes: There are 11,026 campus-years from 1995-98 that have variation across subgroups in their expected 
performance compared to the relevant standard.  For these campus-years, at least one subgroup’s expected pass rate 
is below the standard, and at least one other subgroup either is expected to exceed the standard or has too few 
students to be separately accountable.  Each column in the table reports statistics for the campus subgroup indicated 
in the column heading.  There are a total of 28,984 campus-year-subgroup observations, with the number of 
observations contributed by each race/ethnicity subgroup indicated in the final row.  The top panel shows the mean 
(and standard deviation in parentheses) for the variable indicated by the row heading.  The bottom panel shows the 
fraction of campus-years represented by alternative combinations of relative performance for each subgroup. 
Table 3. Ordinary least-squares regression results for analysis of race/ethnicity subgroups 
Dependent variable = Change in exemption rate  Independent variable 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 














Subgroup is Hispanic and 





(0.007)  —  — 





(0.008)  —  — 
Share low-income in subgroup × 













Share low-income in subgroup × 




Share low-income in subgroup × 
subgroup is “under” ×  
low-income subgroup is “under” 






Subgroup is Hispanic  -0.013
** 
(0.002)  —  -0.017
** 
(0.003)  —  -0.015
** 
(0.002)  — 
Subgroup is Black  -0.014
** 
(0.003)  —  -0.019
** 
(0.003)  —  -0.016
** 
(0.003)  — 












Includes campus × year fixed 
effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Includes campus × subgroup 
fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes:  The sample is restricted to campus-years for which there is variation across subgroups in their expected 
performance compared to the relevant standard.  There are 28,984 observations defined at the level of the campus, 
year, and race/ethnicity subgroup for the years 1995-1998.  Each column presents the results from a separate 
ordinary least-squares regression.  The dependent variable in each case is the change in the exemption rate from the 
prior year for the subgroup.  Standard errors that are robust to unspecified correlation across observations from the 
same campus are shown in parentheses.  In addition to the variables shown, all specifications include the share of 
students in the subgroup scoring in various failing ranges on the math and reading exams in the prior year (the 
measures included for reading are for the same ranges as for the math exam), the change in the share low-income 
from the prior year, the prior level and change in the subgroup’s enrollment share, and the prior level and change in 
the number of students in tested grades (measured by a five-part spline with cut-points defined by quintiles of the 
size distribution).  All specifications also include campus-year fixed effects, and the specifications in the even 
columns add campus-subgroup fixed effects. 
**Indicates significance at the 5-percent level 
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level  
Table 4. Summary statistics for campus-level analysis 
Variable  Mean  Variable  Mean 
Dependent variables    Student characteristics   
Fraction Hispanic  0.347 
(0.316) 
Fraction of students exempt  0.253 
(0.103) 
[0.461]  Fraction Black  0.135 
(0.199)     Fraction special education exempt  0.146 
(0.058) 
[0.562] 
Fraction low-income  0.491 
(0.269) 
Fraction in tested grades  0.580 
(0.263) 
   Fraction LEP exempt  0.044 
(0.090) 
[0.274]  Enrollment in tested grades (3-8,10)  351 
(269)     Fraction mobility exempt  0.049 
(0.027) 
[0.395] 
Predicted overall math pass rate  0.816 
(0.090) 
   Fraction absent/other exempt  0.014 
(0.019) 
[0.402] 
Predicted overall reading pass rate  0.744 
(0.126) 
raw marginal benefit    Relevant ratings category   
   Increased from prior year  0.477     Acceptable  0.066 
   Decreased from prior year  0.398     Recognized  0.667 
   Ambiguous change  0.125     Exemplary  0.267 
   Magnitude conditional on  
   an increase 
0.221 
(0.260) 
District per pupil tax base wealth in 
prior year (thousands of 1998 $) 
192 
(223) 
Notes: The summary statistics are based on the sample of regular schools for the fiscal years 1995 through 1998 
described in the text, and includes a total of 15,657 campus-year observations.  (We exclude the five percent of 
campus-year observations where the most relevant ratings category changes as we trace out the marginal benefits to 
exempting an additional three percent of students).  We show the mean for the variable indicated in the row heading, 
with the standard deviation in parentheses.  For the exemption variables, the fraction of campuses with increases 
from the prior year is also shown in square brackets.  The predicted pass rates are based on the accountability subset 
in the prior year, accounting for statewide increases in pass rates between the prior and current year as described in 
the text.  The relevant ratings category is the one we predict to be the “nearest” from either above or below given the 
predicted overall and subgroup pass rates.  
Table 5. Estimated relationships between one-year changes in exemptions and incentives 
  Dependent variable 
Indicator for exemptions 
increased  Change in exemptions  Sample and exemption type 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Full sample [N=15,657]         













































 No change in relevant ratings category from prior year [N=12,847] 
















































Includes campus fixed effects  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Notes: Each cell presents the coefficient (multiplied by 100) on an indicator for an increase in incentives from the 
prior year from a separate ordinary least-squares regression.  The top panel shows results for the sample of regular 
schools for 1995-98 described in the notes to Table 4.  The bottom panel shows the results for the sub-sample with 
“no change in ratings category” that excludes the 18 percent of campus-year observations where the ratings category 
that is relevant for calculating incentives changes from the prior year.  The rows indicate the type of exemption the 
dependent variable is based on.  The first two columns present results when the dependent variables are defined to 
be indicators for whether the relevant exemption rate increased from the prior year.  Columns 3 and 4 present results 
when the dependent variables are expressed as changes in the rate from the prior year.  Columns 2 and 4 also control 
for campus fixed effects.  Standard errors (multiplied by 100) that are robust to unspecified correlation across 
observations from the same campus are shown in parentheses.  All specifications include the prior level and change 
in the student demographic characteristics shown in Table 4 (with enrollment in tested grades captured by a five-part 
spline with cut-points defined by quintiles of the size distribution), the prior level and change in the grade 
distribution of students in tested grades, predicted overall math and reading pass rates, indicators for the relevant 
ratings category in the prior and current year, prior year per pupil tax base wealth quintile interacted with an 
indicator for the year, and an indicator for an ambiguous change in incentives from the prior year. 
**Indicates significance at the 5-percent level 
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level  
Table 6. Estimated relationships between one-year changes in exemptions and incentives 





inc×￿MB  Sample and dependent variable 
(1a)  (1b)  (2a)  (2b) 
 Full sample [N=15,657]         


















 No change in ratings category [N=12,847] 




















Includes campus fixed effects  No  Yes 
Notes: The top panel shows results for the sample of regular schools for 1995-98 described in the notes to Table 4.  
The bottom panel shows the results for the sub-sample with “no change in ratings category” that excludes the 18 
percent of campus-year observations where the ratings category that is relevant for calculating incentives changes 
from the prior year.  The rows indicate whether the dependent variable is an indicator for an increase in exemptions 
or the change in exemptions.  Columns 1a and 1b present estimated coefficients on an indicator for an increase in 
incentives from the prior year (1
inc) and that indicator interacted with the size of the increase (1
inc×￿MB) in 
specifications that include the full set of control variables describes in the notes to Table 5.  Columns 2a and 2b 
present the same results from specifications that add campus fixed effects as well.  Standard errors that are robust to 
unspecified correlation across observations from the same campus are shown in parentheses.  All coefficients and 
standard errors have been multiplied by 100. 
**Indicates significance at the 5-percent level 
* Indicates significance at the 10-percent level 
 